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NO TO THE EURO: 
THE SWEDISH REFERENDUM OF
SEPTEMBER 14, 2003
Emily E. Henderson
A Resounding No
On September 14, 2003, Swedes voted in
a national referendum to keep their currency,
the krona, in lieu of replacing it with the euro.
The Prime Minister, Goran Persson, called the
referendum “a clear expression of the people’s
will,” acknowledging that “in this result we can
see a deep skepticism toward the entire euro
project among the Swedish people.” (Cowell,
“In a Referendum...”) When all of the 5,976 vot-
ing districts in Sweden had been counted, 41.8
percent voted for the euro and 56.1 percent
voted against: a resounding defeat for the com-
mon currency project, and, in some views,
European integration. (Reed et al.) 
Sweden’s reaction to the tide of European
integration that arose out of the post-World
War II political landscape has been one of hes-
itation. The great losses of the wars of the early
20th century spawned a movement to forge
closer political and economic ties between the
war-torn nations of Europe. (“EUROPA...”) In
order to increase cooperation among these
states, their leaders created three supranation-
al economic bodies, the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC), the European
Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), and
the European Economic Community (EEC). In
1993, the Treaty of Maastricht created the
European Union (EU) as an overarching gov-
erning structure for the members of these eco-
nomic communities and put forth the outlines
of an economic and monetary union as well as
for new initiatives in international defense and
justice. Upon joining the EU in 1995, Sweden
did not request exemption from the currency
union, like the United Kingdom and Denmark,
and thus is legally bound to join the union at
some time in the future. The results of the
September 2003 referendum show that, despite
Sweden’s growing ties with Europe in the mid-
nineties, Swedes are far from certain that full
integration, at least in the form of membership
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in the single currency, is a desirable goal.
Sweden’s rejection of the euro suggests
that, for many Swedes, a decision to adopt the
single currency was not an automatic extension
of EU membership. Even though Swedes are,
overall, happy with their membership in the
EU, they are not yet ready to take the next step
by adopting the euro. This article examines the
reasons behind Sweden’s rejection of the single
currency and concludes that the outcome of the
referendum was the result of Swedes’ percep-
tions of how the euro would affect their sover-
eignty, a form of which is unique to Sweden and
is discussed in detail below. The analysis con-
tinues with a projection of the implications of
the referendum for Sweden’s economy, inter-
nal political climate, and influence in European
affairs. Finally, the article suggests possible
effects of the referendum on the EU and
European integration.
Factors behind the Referendum’s
Outcome
Sweden’s rejection of the euro must be
evaluated not as an independent event but in
the greater context of European integration.
From the beginning of the post-war period,
Sweden, like other northern European nations
including the United Kingdom, Denmark,
Finland, Iceland, and Norway, was reluctant to
acquiesce to calls for the forging of suprana-
tional European institutions. (Ingebritsen, p. 5;
Gstöhl, p. 50) In 1951–52, the first such supra-
national organization, the European Coal and
Steel Community, was established under 
the guidance of Jean Monnet and Robert
Schuman. Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, and Luxembourg were the origi-
nal six ECSC members. When this body proved
successful, albeit limited by the scope of its nar-
row industrial focus, the six members of the
ECSC formed two additional supranational
organizations, the European Atomic Energy
Community and the European Economic
Community, in order to establish stronger ties
between their respective economies. (Harrop,
pp. 15–16) Sweden’s reluctance to join the EEC,
according to some the most important of the
supranational bodies (Harrop, p. 16), stemmed
from its determination to preserve Swedish
neutrality and the welfare state. (Gstöhl, p. 59)
Former Minister of Trade Gunnar Lange encap-
sulated Sweden’s position on European inte-
gration at the time: “The problem with joining
the Six [the EEC] is not primarily an econom-
ic problem: it is instead foremost a political
problem.” (Gstöhl, p. 59)
Many would also argue that despite being
shrouded in the disguise of a primarily eco-
nomic issue, the euro is as much a political
issue as the EEC or, more recently, as EU mem-
bership. According to Erik Jones, “Any change
in the technology of money that transfers con-
trol over its creation away from the state or
from society is first and foremost a matter of
political concern. In theory, the European
Monetary Union (EMU) is apolitical. In practice,
it implies a political system in its own right.”
(Jones, p. 32)
Swedes seem to be in tune with this
notion of the EMU, and the euro, as political
institutions. To different people in different
places and different times, sovereignty can
denote a variety of ideas. One may argue that in
Sweden during the later half of the twentieth
century, sovereignty was inextricably bound to
the notion of the Swedish Model, that is,
Sweden’s unique approach to the social welfare
state that developed out of post-war Europe’s
need for full employment with price stability.
Largely based on the work of two Swedish
Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) econo-
mists, Gosta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner, the
Swedish Model sought to reduce wage-cost
pressures by keeping aggregate demand below
full employment production levels as well as to
create a more equal society through a large wel-
fare system and a “wage policy of solidarity.”
(Silverman, p. 70) The latter policy dictated that
workers doing the same types of jobs at large,
highly efficient firms would be paid the same
wages as those doing the same types of jobs at
small, less efficient firms. If a firm could not be
profitable under these wage restrictions, it
would be forced to close, allowing the workers
to be redistributed to other firms. 
According to Meidner, the development of
this policy is largely based on Sweden’s long-
standing self-image as a “ ‘people’s home’ — a
place where all Swedes could be treated like
members of a family and where such values as
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equality, cooperation, helpfulness, and securi-
ty would prevail,” an image due in no small part
to the success of the Swedish Model during the
1970s and ’80s. (Silverman, p. 70) By the late
1990s, however, Rudolf Meidner saw his pro-
gram disintegrate under foreign pressures:
I think that what is left of the
Swedish model is the feeling, only
the feeling, among people and with-
in the labor movement that we must
return to higher employment and
that there are ways to do it with-
out inflation. At this moment the
Swedish government is totally com-
mitted to the European Monetary
Union rules. But there is a chance
that there will be no EMU in the near
future, and that the Swedish govern-
ment’s extreme commitment to give
the highest priority to price stability
can be modified. I think we can at
least give the same priority to full
employment and try to find solutions
to make full employment and price
stability compatible. (Meidner in
Silverman, p. 70)
In Meidner’s eyes, the EMU is clearly at
odds with the Swedish Model. To many Swedes,
the notion of sovereignty is in some way bound
up with the idea of the Swedish Model and the
feeling that within Sweden lays the potential,
perhaps even the duty, to position itself as a bea-
con of light on the middle road between fascism
and communism. (Miles, pp. 26–35) Policies
that threaten this calling endanger the very
essence of the Swedish identity, and this cuts
to the heart of many Swedes’ qualms in regard
to European monetary integration.
Like the other Nordic countries, Sweden
resisted political integration with Europe up
until the mid-1980s. Economically, however,
Sweden and its neighbors have relied heavily
on Europe as a major trading partner for over
one hundred years. (Ingebritsen, p. 6) By 1990,
in fact, 63 percent of Sweden’s total foreign
trade was with the European Community.
(Ingebritsen, p. 8) 
Several prominent scholars have recog-
nized that such extensive economic integration
has, at least in part, caused Sweden to look
more favorably upon participation in the
European political community since the mid-
1980s, and, in turn, to relinquish many aspects
of the Swedish Model. Lee Miles has proposed
the “Swedish Diamond” as a framework for con-
sidering this factor, as well as several others that
he believes have influenced Swedish policies
toward European integration over the post-war
period. (Miles, p. 17) These include Sweden’s
level of attachment to corporate procedures for
policy making, its highly consensual democrat-
ic political system, and its neutral external envi-
ronment. These three factors served as obsta-
cles to Swedish integration with the European
Community until the 1980s. At that time,
according to Miles, economic factors gained
greater emphasis in the Swedish government’s
decision-making process, pushing Sweden
toward EU membership. (Miles, p. 44) This
movement was expedited by a severe econom-
ic recession in Sweden from 1990–1993, dur-
ing which the nation’s GDP per capita fell to
twelfth in the 1991 OECD survey (from third in
1970). (Miles, p. 194) As a result of this event,
many Swedes began to believe that joining the
European Community would increase its inter-
national competitiveness and thereby help to
preserve Swedish jobs as well as the welfare
state. (Miles, p. 197) Swedish industry led the
call for membership in the European
Community so as to ensure more stable trade
relations and access to foreign markets, even
going so far as to form the “Ja till Europa” (“Yes
to Europe”) public relations campaign. (Gstöhl,
pp. 192–94) Economic woes thus forced
Sweden to change its politics of integration and
forge closer ties with Europe, leading to the
approval of EU membership in 1994 and acces-
sion in 1995. According to Gstöhl, in trading a
portion of its national sovereignty for greater
influence in the European Union, “Sweden’s
‘third way’ identity had lost much of its mean-
ing as the welfare model and foreign policy
gradually converged with the rest of Europe.”
(p. 195)
Sweden’s rapid integration during the
1990s made it a likely candidate for full EMU
membership. As in the debate over EU mem-
bership, national sovereignty, both in econom-
ic and political terms, has also proven to be a
vital issue in the debate over the EMU. Yet while
Swedes were willing to give up much of their
sovereignty in joining the EU, they are less will-
 
ing to give up sovereignty when it pertains to
their currency. This difference is clear from the
discrepancy between Swedes’ opinions of the
EU, which have remained positive since 1995,
and their opinions of the euro, which have
remained negative. While 52 percent of Swedes
voted to join the EU in the 1994 referendum,
public opinion polls taken about the same time
illustrate this divide, showing only 20–30 per-
cent of Swedish voters in favor of future full
participation in the EMU. (Miles, pp. 248 and
315) Despite pressure from the political elite to
begin the process of full integration, Swedes are
less than enthused about the EMU and the euro. 
The reasons for this divide are unclear. The
amount and quality of information about the
euro available to the public could have influ-
enced Swedes’ views of the common currency.
Results of one poll show that 80 percent of
Swedes felt that they were not well informed
about the European currency issue in 1995. The
same poll, however, showed that this result was
in line with the feelings of citizens in the other
EU member states, as 78 percent of these
respondents also said they were not well
informed. (“European Citizens...,” p. 9) In
another poll taken in 2001, however, over 75
percent of Swedes said they were not well
informed or not at all informed about the euro,
while only 53 percent of all respondents from
the EU member states felt the same.
(“Europeans and the Euro”) This shift in the
level of perceived knowledge on the issue with-
in the EU shows that Sweden lagged behind the
rest of the EU nations in public knowledge
about the euro. By the time of the referendum,
however, a large majority (71 percent) of
Swedes felt that they had received all of the
information necessary in order to vote. (“Post-
referendum in Sweden,” p. 10) These results
suggest that a lack of public knowledge about
the euro did not play a large role in setting
Swedes against the common currency in 2003. 
When researchers took exit polls in dis-
tricts that accurately predicted the outcome of
the September 2003 referendum, they asked
participants what issues mattered the most to
them in dictating how they voted. Swedes who
voted no said that the welfare state was only the
fourth most important issue, while interest rate
control was third. Perhaps surprisingly, democ-
racy was the most significant issue for those
who voted no, and sovereignty was second.
(“Why They Said No…”) Although both terms
have broad meanings, they may be more spe-
cific in their Swedish contexts. Sovereignty has
been discussed above in the context of the
Swedish Model. Democracy in Sweden connotes
openness and consensual decision-making, two
characteristics which many Swedes see a lack
of in EU decision-making. (Miles, pp. 18–19) 
Many Swedes viewed the EU with suspi-
cion in regard to its ability to maintain their
meaning of democracy during the fall of 2003.
According to a Eurobarometer Poll taken in the
spring of 2003, three out of four Swedes are sat-
isfied with the manner in which democracy
functions in Sweden; only one half of respon-
dents from the other EU countries would, 
on average, say the same in regard to the 
state of democracy in their own countries.
(“Eurobarometer 60”) On the other hand,
Swedes’ views of the workings of democracy
within the EU are more negative than the aver-
age views of the citizens of the other member
countries. 
Such concerns reveal the great trepidation
with which many Swedes view their place in the
new Europe. Even a national tragedy, initially
expected to help the yes campaign, could not
turn the tables in favor of those who supported
the euro. With the murder of popular Foreign
Minister Anna Lindh, a likely candidate to
become Sweden’s next Prime Minister and a
vigorous promoter of the euro, many believed
that wavering and undecided voters would vote
yes in a show of sympathy for the slain leader.
According to The Economist, “Mrs. Lindh’s
murder has made the outcome of the referen-
dum harder to predict. Given her enthusiasm
for the single currency, her death may arouse
sympathy votes on Sunday.” (“Tragedy before a
Referendum”) Although Swedes bitterly
mourned Lindh’s passing, their grief does not
seem to have had an impact on their decisions
pertaining to the euro. A Eurobarometer Poll
shows that only two percent of Swedes decided
how they would vote in the referendum direct-
ly after Lindh’s assassination. In fact, the poll
indicates that 72 percent of voters made up
their minds on the issue at the time the refer-
endum was announced or in the early stages of
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the campaign. (“Post-referendum in Sweden,”
pp. 15–16)
After Lindh’s death, Prime Minister Goran
Persson, the leader of the pro-euro camp, sus-
pended all further campaigning for the yes side
but maintained that the referendum should
take place as planned. This was a small conces-
sion, in the end, from a campaign supported by
Swedish business owners that outspent the no
side five to one. Just over a week before the ref-
erendum, The Economist speculated that “the
riches of the yes side may be helping the no
team by making it look like David to the pro-
yes Goliath: the people versus the establish-
ment.” (“The Noes Are Ahead”) 
The no side may also have benefited from
their lack of a leader, without whom that of the
yes side, Persson, had no one with whom to
compete for votes. Although this may seem like
an advantage, Persson scrambled during the
height of the campaign, never establishing a
concrete strategy, even announcing that a yes
vote was still, in practice, a call to “wait and
see.” “He’s a very intelligent man,” Lotta
Hedstrom, a Green Party MP, stated, “but one
minute he’s telling people to vote for the euro,
the next he’s attacking the stability pact which
is key to the euro.” (Willsher)
Persson’s misgivings about the Stability
and Growth Pact are not outlandish, and, in
fact, may reflect the concerns of many Swedes.
The Pact emerged in 1997 at the European
Council in Amsterdam and articulated the prin-
ciple that member states should avoid signifi-
cant budget deficits. (Jones, p. 40) The largest
EU countries, France and Germany, have both
surpassed the Pact’s maximum budget deficit
limit, that is, three percent of a country’s GDP.
Less than a week prior to the Swedish referen-
dum, French Budget Minister Alain Robert said
that France’s budget deficit would remain above
the limit until at least 2006. Germany’s budget
deficit for 2003 was 3.9 percent of GDP, putting
it in breach of the Pact for the third consecu-
tive year. France and Germany certainly did not
help the situation when both countries asked
for and were granted exemptions from paying
fines of 0.5 percent of GDP for these transgres-
sions. Such a blatant disregard for the terms of
the Stability and Growth Pact has led Swedes
to question the benefit of joining the monetary
union. (Rhoads) Why should Swedes abide by
the terms of the Pact, the budget restrictions of
which would threaten Sweden’s ability to main-
tain its comprehensive welfare system, when
other nations refuse to do so?  As a result of
these events, many Swedes perceive keeping the
krona for the time being as a better economic
decision than adopting the euro. 
In addition to the financial transgressions
of France and Germany, the case for joining the
EMU was hurt by the state of the Swedish econ-
omy, which, in the months leading up to the
referendum, was outperforming the euro-zone
economy in several key measures. While
Sweden’s unemployment rate was around 5.4
percent in September 2003, the euro-zone’s
unemployment rate hovered around nine per-
cent. Furthermore, according to the Economist
Intelligence Unit, Sweden’s expected GDP
growth for 2003 was 1.3 percent, compared to
0.6 percent in the EMU countries. For 2004,
Sweden’s predicted GDP growth, 2.3 percent, is
also expected to outperform that of the coun-
tries currently using the euro, whose GDP
growth is projected at only 1.8 percent.
(“Tragedy before...” and “Why the Voters...”) A
study of Eurobarometer data from 1992 to 2000
suggests that support for the euro has histori-
cally depended on the performance of the
domestic currencies in those countries that, at
the times the polls were taken, had adopted the
euro. (Banducci et al., p. 700) The stronger eco-
nomic performance in Sweden, combined with
France and Germany’s open disregard for the
Stability and Growth Pact, made the euro a hard
sell for many Swedes.
The fear that the budget restrictions of the
Stability and Growth Pact might force Sweden
to pull back from its “cradle to the grave” wel-
fare system has, in some ways, already become
a reality. Currently, the state appears to be over-
burdened in some fundamental sectors. A high-
ly public example of this tension involves an
inmate of a psychiatric institute who, due to the
rising costs of state-provided care for such peo-
ple, could not be confined to the facility caring
for him and thus was free to come and go as he
wished. During the week prior to the referen-
dum, he kidnapped a five-year-old girl known
as “Sabina” and stabbed her to death. (Cowell,
“Sweden’s Brooding...”) For a country with low
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violent crime rates and in which senior politi-
cians walk to work with no bodyguard, such an
act highlights the limits of Sweden’s welfare
system and the urgency of this problem. 
Fear that the Swedish welfare state would
come apart under the euro is apparent from the
demographics of the final results of the refer-
endum. The groups of voters who were largely
against the euro were also those who stood to
gain the most from living in a welfare state:
women, the young (voters aged 18–30 voted no
to the euro more than any other age group),
blue-collar workers, and public sector employ-
ees. (“Why They Said No”) The most affluent,
cosmopolitan areas of Sweden, such as
Stockholm County, were the only areas to
record more voters in favor of the euro than
against. The majority, in fact, of the more rural,
isolated counties north of Stockholm recorded
that at least 70 percent of their populations
voted against the euro. (Aylott, “Referendum...,”
p. 5)
The Impact of the Referendum on
Sweden
Just as there was much debate before the
referendum, much discussion of what the result
would mean for Sweden’s future emerged in the
months following the vote. Politically, the con-
sequences will not be grave, especially for
Goran Persson and the Social Democrats. The
Prime Minister said long before the referendum
that if his country rejected the euro he would
not resign. (Aylott, “Referendum...,” p. 2) On
the other hand, the loss of Anna Lindh, a
staunch ally of Persson, as well as divisions in
the party stemming from its internal disagree-
ments over the euro, may weaken the Social
Democrats’ ability to maintain power.
According to Reed et al., “The 14-point margin
of victory for the no’s...left Swedish politics in
tatters.” (p. 28) It remains to be seen whether
this assessment will ring true, or whether
Persson and the Social Democrats will main-
tain power.
After the defeat, Persson said that “Sweden
would suffer in the long term for staying out of
the euro.” (“Keeping the Krona”) Whether such
an ominous warning has merit is a point of
debate, particularly in terms of Sweden’s abili-
ty to function in international affairs. The
European Commission recently stated that
Sweden’s inward investment in the EU had
dropped from six percent to three percent in the
past few years. (“Keeping the Krona”) Although
Sweden fares relatively well in comparison to
its competitors in attracting international cap-
ital and is likely to continue to do so even after
the referendum, many believe that adopting the
euro would allow the country to attract an even
greater amount of such inward investment.
(“Tragedy before...”) Outside of the euro-zone,
volatile exchange rates could lessen Sweden’s
role in the global capital market over time.
(“Tragedy before...”) 
Despite this analysis, the economic bene-
fits that Sweden would have accrued by joining
the euro were never clear. Greater foreign direct
investment and stable exchange rates would
certainly have aided Swedish business. The
macroeconomic effects of the euro, however,
were less clear, since the loss of control over
monetary policy could have both helped and
hindered the Swedish economy. (Jakobsson)
One cannot say for sure whether or not the
Swedish economy will feel significant direct
effects from the referendum.
Sweden may, however, see greater reper-
cussions in its relationship to the EU. Its geo-
graphic location and long history of neutrality
in European and world affairs have made it, to
some extent, a European outsider. Without fur-
ther committing to Europe by adopting the
euro, Sweden could miss out on future oppor-
tunities to influence important EU economic
developments. 
Others see Swedes asserting more influ-
ence on euro-zone monetary policy outside of
the common currency. (“Keeping the Krona”)
After emerging from a public finance crisis in
the early 1990s, Sweden has sought to imple-
ment a more conservative and responsible fis-
cal planning system. (“Keeping the Krona”) If
Sweden continues to prosper, it may set a bet-
ter example for the EU to follow as a euro-zone
outsider than as an insider.
Repercussions for the EU
How will the Swedes’ rejection of the euro
affect the EU?  Perhaps the most immediate
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impact of the referendum will come in the
United Kingdom and Denmark, the other two
northern EU nations who have, like Sweden, so
far eschewed the euro. The no sides in both
countries will be bolstered by Sweden’s deci-
sion, and their governments may postpone any
decision on the issue, through referendum or
otherwise. (“Voters Can Be Such a Nuisance...”) 
In the U.K., public opinion is still very
much against the EMU. Blair’s government can-
celled a pro-euro “road show” campaign
planned for the summer of 2004. There is little
likelihood that there will be a British decision
on the euro before the next election in 2005 or
2006. (Cowell, “Without Glue...”) With the
economies of both the U.K. and Denmark, like
that of Sweden, doing better overall than the
euro-zone economies, warnings of economic
stagnation have not yet taken hold. (Reed et al.)
Only time will tell if these three major outliers
will eventually join the EMU.
When the EU expanded in May 2004, it
incorporated ten new countries,1 many of which
are smaller and less prosperous than the U.K.,
Denmark, and Sweden. All of the newest mem-
bers will be required to adopt the euro when
they meet the convergence criteria; although
this same requirement has not stopped Sweden
from staying out of the euro-zone, the newest
member states are more favorable to the idea.
The eventual inclusion of these nations within
the euro-zone, however, may create problems
for the EU. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and
the Baltic states, for example, all possess inef-
ficient agricultural sectors and poorer popula-
tions which will force the EU to alter programs
such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
and funds for regional development. (Gilbert,
p. 225) To such countries, the euro-zone’s eco-
nomic strength is highly attractive, whereas it
is less than desirable to those countries, such
as the U.K., Denmark, and Sweden, whose
economies currently outperform the euro-zone.
This fact could prove to be a major disadvan-
tage in the EU’s expansion as it adopts new
member states and eventually includes them in
the euro-zone. (Champion and Rhoads) 
Some commentators have said that before
the EMU can work, a greater European politi-
cal identity is necessary. According to this view,
EU officials should not rely on monetary union
to bring about political accord; the latter must
arise independently of the euro. Jonathan Lipow
of the Jerusalem Post cites the United States as
an example of a currency union that “has been
a smashing success,” eliminating “a major bar-
rier to cross-border trade and investment.”
(Lipow) While the United States established its
currency union after it had become politically
unified, the EMU is designed to foster political
union and even a European identity. This is a
dangerous proposition for a continent with
such strong historical divisions.
The results of the Swedish referendum are
unlikely to stop European integration in its
tracks. According to a survey taken days after
the referendum, 60 percent of Swedes approve
of their country’s membership in the European
Union, with only 32 percent disapproving.
(“Post-referendum in Sweden,” p. 29) The sur-
vey also showed that a large majority of the pop-
ulation (87 percent) believes that Sweden will
adopt the euro as its currency at some point in
the future. Only eight percent of Swedes believe
that the euro will never replace the krona.
These statistics strongly indicate that Sweden’s
future will include the adoption of the euro and,
as a result, further integration with the other
members of the EU. The European Commission
has sought to minimize the significance of the
rejection by stating that one “shouldn’t extrap-
olate” more meaning than is necessary from the
Swedes’ decision not to adopt the euro and that
one should take the results “for what they are.”
(Champion and Rhoads) Still, however, clear
obstacles remain for the EU to overcome in its
path to a unified Europe. 
Popular opinion, even in the euro-zone
nations, wavers on the currency. Surveys show
that from January 2002 to November 2003 pub-
lic satisfaction with the euro has fallen contin-
uously. While 67 percent of euro-zone citizens
were very or quite satisfied with the euro in the
beginning of this period, that number had fall-
en to 47 percent by November 2003. (“Euro —
Two Years Later,” p. 54) This shift may be due
in part to the fact that many citizens of the
euro-zone countries have not yet been con-
1The ten new EU members as of May 1, 2004, are the
Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
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vinced of the economic merits of the currency.
Price increases during the changeover have left
Europeans in many countries unsure of the
currency’s benefits. A shop owner in Rome
griped, “The price increases have been ridicu-
lous.... We should go back to the Italian lira
because with the euro everyone is trying to rip
us off.” (Fleishman) Perhaps these problems are
mere growing pains in the early stages of the
EMU or are the byproducts of a weak U.S. dol-
lar. They must, however, give some pause as to
the future ability of the euro project to bring
about further European integration.
No to the Euro, but What to Europe?
On the voting ballots of the September 14
referendum, Swedes were asked the question,
“Do you think Sweden should introduce the
euro as its currency?” The simplicity of the
question belies the complex reality of the issue.
The EMU, born from institutions that emerged
out of the devastation of the first half of the
twentieth century, is more than a monetary
union to Europe; rather, it is an integral part of
a broader project to unify the continent, pre-
vent future conflict, and increase its global
importance as a collective body. 
For Sweden, the euro is more than just a
currency. It is a symbol of supranational coop-
eration and Sweden’s role in European politi-
cal integration. Although the economic impact
of the no vote may not alter Sweden’s course
for the near future, the political impact of the
vote may prove more lasting. By remaining out-
side of the euro-zone for at least the next sev-
eral years, Sweden may be disabling its oppor-
tunity to shape the still-developing EU into a
form which is in greater accord with the
Swedish model. There will come a time when
Sweden will no longer be able to afford to be
half European and half Swedish; one day soon,
it must decide whether or not to be Swedish is
also to be European.
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